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MAKING SENSE OF EQUALITY
ONE ANOTHER’S EQUALS: THE BASIS OF HUMAN
EQUALITY. By Jeremy Waldron.1 Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press. 2017. Pp. xi + 264. $29.95
(hardcover).
Mark D. Rosen2
Thomas Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence’s
other signatories professed it “self-evident that all men are
created equal.”3 Renowned Yale historian Edmund Morgan
used less exalted language, insisting that equality is a “fiction,”
albeit an important and necessary one.4 Morgan thought it a
fiction insofar as it would be “difficult, if not impossible, to
demonstrate the[] proposition[] by factual evidence[,]” and that,
to the contrary, it “might be somewhat easier, by the kind of
evidence we usually require for the proof of any debatable
proposition, to demonstrate that men are not created
equal . . . .”5 But Morgan thought it “not inappropriate” to call
equality a self-evident truth because such a designation “implies
our commitment” to equality and “protects [it] from challenge.”6
All societies, Morgan suggests, are built on cornerstone
commitments that are ultimately indemonstrable. “[T]o
challenge” our commitment to equality, says Morgan, “would
rend the fabric of our society.”7
1. University Professor, New York University School of Law.
2. University Distinguished Professor, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. I
received extremely helpful comments from Mark Alznauer, Katherine Baker, Alex BoniSaenz, Todd Ferguson, Sam Fleischacker, and Steve Heyman. This essay is dedicated to
my lovely daughter Tila, who to my delight both is, and is not, the equal of her brothers.
(Mutatis mundi as regards each of her siblings).
3. Jefferson wrote the first draft of the Declaration, which declared it “sacred and
undeniable[]” that “all men are created equal.” See THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
VOL. 1, 1760–1776, at 423 (Julian P. Boyd, ed.).
4. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE 14 (1988).
5. See id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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In short, Jefferson treats equality as an unprovable axiom8;
Morgan suggests doing otherwise would be unwise and
dangerous. Consistent with Jefferson’s and Morgan’s
approaches, America’s commitment to equality has not been
given a foundational justification.
Until now. In an important new book, One Another’s
Equals: The Basis of Human Equality, Jeremy Waldron aims to
philosophically ground this basic American commitment (pp. 66,
84). While its arguments are illuminating and deeply
consequential, this Review argues that Waldron’s book
ultimately does not take equality far beyond a Jeffersonian
axiom, mostly (though not entirely) owing to the book’s selfconscious epistemic modesty. The Review also argues that
Waldron makes more of a case for “sharedness” than for
“equality,” as it explains why they are conceptually distinct
notions. These limitations do not undermine the importance of
Waldron’s book, but they may have implications for what we
understand Waldron’s project to be.
The Review also suggests a need to tame some of Waldron’s
conclusions as to equality’s prescriptive and normative
implications. Waldron seems to say that equality’s entailments
are absolute in two senses: that they accrue equally to every
person, and that they trump all competing moral considerations.
The Review argues that the book does not adequately make the
case for either absolutism, and shows that Waldron himself
resists both absolutisms when considering concrete cases. And
this is a good thing, because giving strict effect to the two
absolutisms would problematically destabilize substantial swaths
of contemporary constitutional jurisprudence.
More generally, the Review argues that accepting the two
absolutisms would unduly cede contemporary human agency.
Today’s analysis cannot generate tomorrow’s final answers
because there is no “end-of-history” for normativity.
Accordingly, each generation’s recognition of its necessary
agency in working out equality’s entailments is more sensible
than an absolutism-induced passivity. But though it should not
8. This may oversimplify Jefferson’s position, insofar as he likely was aware of the
arguments for equality that had been propounded by the important enlightenment
thinkers, in particular Locke and Hobbes. But Waldron is quite right in his observation
that “not nearly enough work has been done” to provide a philosophical account of
human equality (p. 15).
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be treated as the final word on the subject, One Another’s
Equals can enormously assist the agency-demanding
undertaking of continuing to work out what should follow from
our political community’s commitment to equality. Waldron’s
book can serve an invaluable task, pace Morgan’s implicit advice
that we not dig too deeply into our cornerstone political
commitments.
I. BASIC EQUALITY
Waldron’s book aims to develop an account of what he calls
the principle of basic equality, namely the “idea that we humans
are fundamentally one another’s equals” (p. 10). The book does
not address what Waldron dubs “surface-level equality,” namely
the “sort of social or economic equality” for which egalitarians
have mostly argued; for example, equality of well-being,
resources, opportunity, or capabilities (pp. 9-10).9 Basic equality
is conceptually distinct from surface-level equality,10 and has
received relatively little scholarly attention (p. 10).
Waldron thinks that basic equality applies to all human
beings—to Hitler and Mother Theresa, as well as the most
profoundly disabled and those in the final stages of Alzheimer’s
disease. He calls this position continuous equality (pp. 30-31). By
contrast, many past proponents of equality thought certain
subsets of the human population were not their equal; excluded
subpopulations have included slaves, blacks, Asians, heathens,
and women. These past proponents adopted what might be
called discontinuous equality.11 Waldron also champions the view
that basic equality applies only to human beings, and not to
other animals.12 He dubs this distinctive equality (pp. 30-31). In
short, in embracing continuous and distinctive equality, Waldron
claims that basic equality extends to all human beings, and only
to human beings.
9. Although Waldron agrees such issues are “by no means superficial” (p. 10), his
nomenclature of “‘surface-level”’ might be criticized as impliedly giving them short shrift.
10. Waldron thinks Peter Westen’s well known critique of equality applies to
surface-level equality, but not basic equality (pp. 67-68). Later I suggest otherwise.
11. This phrase simplifies Waldron’s. See pp. 26-32 (discussing “Rashdalldiscontinuities”).
12. Waldron does not take up the question of whether basic equality might apply
to intelligent machines. See generally Cliff Kuang, Can A.I. Be Taught to Explain Itself?,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/21/magazine/can-ai-betaught-to-explain-itself.html?_r=0.
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According to Waldron, the principle of basic equality “is
itself prescriptive” (p. 46), meaning that it “call[s] for something
to be done that might not otherwise be done” (p. 42). Waldron
believes that basic equality performs very substantial
prescriptive and normative work,13 including “sustaining human
dignity” (p. 207), “underpin[ning] the entitlement of each of us
to justice,” and “ground[ing] the equal basic rights we have” (p.
142), including free speech, personal liberty, and religion (p.
249). Basic equality also imposes demands on us in our political
relations with our fellow citizens. Basic equality “requires that
we are to be counted equally in any calculation of the general
good,” and “ground[s] some sense of our equal authority, equal
respect, leading into democracy as well as the autonomy we are
entitled to in the living of our lives” (pp. 141-142). This equal
respect amounts to a “form of deference and accommodation,”
and includes the “recognition and acknowledgement of someone
as an intellect with a point of view and opinions of her own . . .”
(p. 250). And Waldron thinks that basic equality imposes
obligations that extend beyond fellow members of our political
community. For example, Waldron thinks basic equality
absolutely forbids torturing a terrorist to extract information
that would foil a future attack (pp. 186-187).
Although One Another’s Equals leaves most of basic
equality’s concrete implications for constitutional law
substantially unspecified, basic equality would seem to be
potentially relevant to a wide range of constitutional issues. At
one point Waldron suggests that basic equality might imply an
entitlement to certain economic goods.14 And basic equality’s
13. By normative, Waldron means the “generation or use of general norms” (p.
43). Waldron tells us that his prescriptive claims “usually. . . involve . . . normativity” as
well (p. 43).
14. See p. 37 (arguing that “[s]urface-level inequalities involving absolute
deprivation might be denounced on t[he] basis” of the “normative principle” of “basic
equality,” and “perhaps certain levels of relative deprivation” as well). At one point, the
Supreme Court’s equal protection fundamental rights jurisprudence seemed amenable to
treating poverty as a suspect class with the result that government policies that
differentially affected the poor would be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. See
generally Frank I. Michelman, Foreword, On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969). And even contemporary doctrine suggests that
absolute deprivations of certain basic goods might be unconstitutional, at least when
government makes those goods available to some people. See San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20 (1973) (“The precedents of this Court provide the
proper starting point. The individuals, or groups of individuals, who constituted the class
discriminated against in our prior cases shared two distinguishing characteristics: because
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entailments of dignity and autonomy seem germane to the
constitutional analysis of the death penalty, the right-to-die, and
abortion, as well as the freedoms of speech and religion (pp. 249250).
Waldron’s distinction between an account that can justify
the principle of basic equality, on the one hand, and normative
equality’s prescriptive implications, on the other, puts the reader
on notice as to the burden that One Another’s Equals
appropriately bears. As Waldron himself notes, the justifications
for basic equality must be sufficient to sustain the principle’s
prescriptions (pp. 248-250). In keeping with this, Part II of this
review focuses on Waldron’s arguments for basic equality, while
Part III analyzes what Waldron takes to be basic equality’s
prescriptive implications. The Review identifies some important
disconnects between One Another’s Equals’ justifications and
prescriptions.
II. THE SURPRISINGLY MODEST CASE FOR BASIC
EQUALITY
Waldron’s argument for basic equality can be reduced to
three steps. A bird’s-eye-view will prove useful before
proceeding to a fine-grained analysis. Step One is that humans
have certain properties that account for basic equality: the
capacities to feel pain and affection; to engage in abstract,
practical, and moral reasoning; and to be the substantial authors
of their own lives (pp. 88-111). These properties that “host”
basic equality are unique to human beings among all known
living creatures, in degree if not kind (pp. 86, 175).
Steps Two and Three rely on a concept from mathematics
known as a range property, which made a fleeting (and not

of their impecunity they were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a
consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to
enjoy that benefit.”). And even if poverty’s constitutional implications remain largely
judicially unenforced, basic equality’s constitutional implications could be—and, some
would argue, should be—taken up by the political branches. See generally LAWRENCE G.
SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
PRACTICE 101–02 (2004) (“Basic welfare payments and public education at the
elementary and secondary levels ought to be understood as constitutional entitlements,
the primary provision of which is the constitutional responsibility of nonjudicial
governmental bodies.”). I fully agree with Sager’s argument, though this Review is not
the proper place to elaborate.
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widely known) appearance in John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice.15
To understand what a range property is, think of the set of
points that are found in the interior of a circle (pp. 117-119).
Two distinct points within the circle have scalar differences if
they have different locations in relation to the circle’s center.
But those scalar differences have no relevance as regards the
interiority of a circle. The circle’s interiority is a range property:
the two above-mentioned points fully and equally satisfy the
range property of interiority, despite their having scalar
differences that serve to distinguish them in relation to other
properties (such as their location in relation to the center).
The Second Step of Waldron’s argument is that the host
properties that underpin basic equality are range properties (p.
247). Though there are scalar differences across individuals in
respect of each host property, such differences are irrelevant for
purposes of basic equality. So long as an individual’s host
properties fall within the range, she is equal to all other humans
with in-range host properties for purposes of basic equality.
Scalar differences as to those properties may be relevant for
other purposes, some of which may be very important. For
example, different capacities to engage in moral reasoning (one
of the host properties) may affect the quality of the moral life
one leads. But Waldron claims that scalar differences as to the
host properties are irrelevant as regards basic equality so long as
those differences fall within the range, precisely because the host
properties are range properties in relation to basic equality.
To appreciate Step Three of Waldron’s argument, think
back again to the interiority of a circle. Though range property
eliminates the significance of scalar differences between all
points within the circle, range property does not thereby
eliminate differences among all possible points. Points outside
the circle are not within the range property of interiority.
Likewise, Waldron’s reliance on range properties to ground
basic equality raises the question of whether basic equality holds
for individuals whose host properties fall outside of the range—
for instance the profoundly disabled,16 late stage Alzheimer’s
patients, infants, fetuses, and (arguably) Hitler. Step Three of

15. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 508.
16. Waldron provides a sensitive, carefully nuanced definition of profoundly
disabled (pp. 217-220).
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Waldron’s argument explains why basic equality should extend
to all these beings.17
Taken together, Waldron’s elegant three-step argument
leads to the conclusion that basic equality applies to all human
beings (continuous equality), and only to human beings
(distinctive equality). But how powerful is each step?
A. STEP ONE
1. Epistemic Modesty
The properties identified in Step One are the crux of
Waldron’s argument for basic equality. This is because the other
two steps presuppose that those properties adequately justify
basic equality, as they merely (though crucially) work out the
implications of two complicating realities: first, that people do
not have equal measure of the properties (Step Two); and
second, that some people have virtually none (or none) of one
(or more) of the properties (Step Three).
The strength of Waldron’s argument accordingly hangs on
the firmness of Step One’s conclusions. And how strong are
they? Two factors account for the epistemic modesty of Step
One’s conclusions. The first is how those properties are
identified and justified. The second is the connection Waldron
thinks those properties bear to the conclusion of basic equality.
It is useful to examine the second factor before proceeding to
the first.
a. Supervenience
Waldron
uses
the
technical
philosophical
term
supervenience to describe the relationship between the
properties and basic equality (pp. 61-66). He says basic equality
“supervene[s] upon” those properties (pp. 57, 111). When one
property supervenes upon another property it means that the
former cannot exist without the latter. This does not mean,
however, that the former is reducible to, or is causally connected
to, the latter (pp. 61). Thus Waldron does not claim that the host
properties “logically compel[]” a belief or conclusion as to
17. But see infra note 60 (addressing scattered statements in the book to the effect
that range property is not relied upon to justify basic equality’s extension to the
profoundly disabled).

9 - ROSEN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

500

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

10/6/18 10:58 AM

[Vol. 33:493

human equality (pp. 135-136). It simply is to say that any being
that possesses the host properties will also possess the property
of basic equality, though the ways in which the former
determines the latter are not straightforward or mechanical (pp.
61-62).
Waldron provides an example of this type of relationship
from the subfield of philosophy known as philosophy of mind.
Supervenience is invoked to describe the relationship between
consciousness and the physical brain. Consciousness, it is said,
supervenes upon the brain’s physical structures and activities.
Supervenience captures the notion that consciousness is reliant
or dependent upon neural activity, whether or not consciousness
is reducible to, or caused by, the brain’s physical processes.18
By invoking supervenience, Waldron takes the position that
basic equality bears a significant, but unspecifiable, relationship
to the properties. What can be said is that basic equality is
neither logically entailed by, nor caused by, the properties. The
supervenient properties serve as the ‘host’ for basic equality in
some ultimately indescribable respect.19 Waldron’s reliance on
supervenience is one factor that accounts for the epistemic
modesty of his book’s conclusions.
An important question Waldron doesn’t adequately address
is why supervenience is the appropriate logic to ground
arguments for, and conclusions concerning, basic equality.20 In
some domains of knowledge we have higher expectations of
demonstration than supervenience promises and delivers. Why
shouldn’t we expect more than supervenience here? This
question’s significance is bolstered by this Review’s ultimate
claim that Waldron’s arguments more readily support a property
that is conceptually distinct from basic equality.21 That critique
puts added pressure on the need to justify supervenience’s
18. For an unusual purely physical account of consciousness, see DANIEL
DENNETT, THE EVOLUTION OF MINDS: FROM BACTERIA TO BACH AND BACK (2017).
Some moral philosophers also invoke supervenience, to describe the relation between
facts and moral conclusions. See, e.g., T.M. SCANLON, BEING REALISTIC ABOUT
REASONS 3, 33 (2013) (explaining supervenience in relation to “normative and nonnormative facts”).
19. Waldron regularly uses ‘host’ as a stand-in for supervenience (e.g., p. 86).
20. See pp. 61-66, 135-136 (introducing supervenience, though not justifying its
applicability to the context of equality, perhaps because “supervenience is defended
intuitively” in the other areas where it is used).
21. See infra Part II.B.4.
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appropriateness for basic equality, for if the critique succeeds—
meaning that Waldron’s arguments better justify something
conceptually distinct from equality—then it becomes all the
more necessary to explain why supervenience should be invoked
to bridge the gap between that something else and equality.
b. Methodology for Identifying the Properties
The second reason for Step One’s epistemic modesty is that
Waldron’s method for identifying and justifying the host
properties relies on the reader’s predisposition to accept basic
equality. To his credit, Waldron is up front about this. The
following is representative of what he says numerous times: “We
might begin with some conviction about equality or some
commitment to it . . . and that might inform our search for an
underlying property. And then we buy into the whole thing as a
package” (p. 64).22
Waldron does not claim that the properties “compel a belief
in human equality” (pp. 135-136). Rather, the book aims to
“make sense” of “[o]ur decision to take up the moral principle of
equality” (pp. 135-136).23 And this “making sense” is not
intended to even rise to the level of a “mode of endorsement”
(p. 135). Instead, in “making sense” of equality, Waldron hopes
to make it “intelligible,” to both egalitarians and nonegalitarians, why egalitarians find equality appealing (pp. 135136).24
Waldron’s account thus presupposes the appeal of the
foundational principle it aims to justify. For this reason,
22. See also p. 65 (“It is possible that . . . [w]e come into the discussion with a rough
conviction that we are one another’s equals, or a determination to behave as though we
were; and that informs the way we look for (and what we say about) the properties on
which, upon reflection, we say that equality is based.”); id. at 66 (“[W]e are not looking
for a descriptive property to drive us toward equality or to prove that equality is valid.
Rather, we are looking for a descriptive property whose conjunction with our
prescriptive position will help make sense of the whole egalitarian package.”).
23. See also p. 252. Other contemporary philosophers also invoke the language of
“making sense,” though some use the term differently than Waldron does. See, e.g.,
TERRY PINKARD, DOES HISTORY MAKE SENSE? HEGEL ON THE HISTORICAL SHAPES
OF JUSTICE 13–19 (2017) (using “‘making sense”’ to describe the thinking process Hegel
thought appropriate to the domain of “‘concept,”’ which Hegel thought was susceptible
to absolute human understanding).
24. See also p. 137 (“[I]n accounting for the appeal of foundational principles, we
are not in a position to invoke anything more rigorous than the idea of such a principle
making sense . . .”).
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Waldron’s project of “making sense” of equality may not be very
useful, or sensible, unless it were directed to an audience that
already accepted, or at least were strongly disposed to accepting,
basic equality. And Waldron recognizes this. Echoing the
Aristotelian notion that people become habituated to virtue,25
Waldron suggests that “[s]eeing people in a certain way is
perhaps inseparable from resolving to treat them as one
another’s equals, and somebody who has not resolved to treat
them as his equals may complain that he really doesn’t ‘get’ the
description under which they are one another’s equals” (p. 65).
This concession seems to be in tension with half of Waldron’s
making-sense project, for if someone not already on board with
equality is not expected to “get” the idea of equality, can
Waldron make basic equality intelligible to non-egalitarians?26 In
any event, even as regards those of us who already accept basic
equality, Waldron advises “[w]e may have to embrace the
accusation, often put forward by anti-egalitarians” that we “see
people as equals, descriptively, only because we are already
determined, prescriptively, to treat them as equals” (p. 66)
(emphasis omitted).
Whether basic equality is appealing to people is an
empirical question. I suspect that continuous equality holds
substantial appeal to most citizens of today’s liberal
democracies. But that conclusion does not carry over to most
societies during most of history—even very recent history,
including recent American history. For example, it seems
unlikely that slaveholders, or white citizens in the Jim Crow era,
accepted (or were inclined to accept) continuous equality.27 And
25. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. II, at 1103a 14–25 (Terence Irwin
trans., Hackett Publishing Co., Inc. 2nd ed. 1999).
26. Part of making sense’s task is to make equality intelligible to non-egalitarians
(pp. 135-136).
27. The truth of the statement above in text is historically contingent, for it is
possible to imagine a world in which slaveholders accepted continuous equality, believing
slavery to be a divine punishment for sin, for example. Be that as it may, the Supreme
Court’s words in Dred Scott would seem to constitute evidence that Whites did not view
Black slaves as such. In holding that people “whose ancestors were negroes of the
African race, and imported into this country, and sold and held as slaves” were not
citizens of the United States for purposes of the Constitution, Chief Justice Taney’s
opinion stated that slaves “were considered “as a subordinate and inferior class of beings,
who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet
remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who
held the power and the Government might choose to grant them.” Dred Scott v. Sanford,
60 U.S. 393, 404–05 (1857).
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Blacks are not the only subpopulation that have been thought to
be exceptions to basic equality.28 Most societies for most of
human history had hereditary and caste-type social structures
that fixed social roles on the basis of what were seen as “intrinsic
or inborn differences among people.”29 How persuasive would
One Another’s Equals have been to people in these societies?
The answer, even according to Waldron, would seem to be “not
much.”
A cynic might take this to mean that the book merely
preaches to the choir as it provides a post-hoc rationalization of
a widely held contemporary intuition.30 This grossly undersells
One Another’s Equals value, but I must lay some groundwork to
explain why.
2. The Three Properties
Let us now turn to the three properties that Waldron
believes jointly play host to basic equality. The first is the
capacity to feel pain and affection (pp. 88-91). Although nonhuman animals also have these capacities to varying degrees,
Waldron plausibly claims that distinctive equality supervenes
upon the capacity for affection as it tails towards love (pp. 9091). “[T]he capacity to recognize and identify with another
person, to involve oneself existentially in the way things are and
how things go for the other person, and to both lose oneself and
find oneself in such a relationship”—a genuinely lovely
description of love—appears to be uniquely human (p. 91).
Waldron’s second host property is the capacity to reason.
He identifies three distinctive sorts of reasoning capacities.
Abstract reasoning relies on imagination, and is the prerequisite
for such apparently exclusive human phenomena as religion (p.
95) and the recognition of one’s continuity over time (pp. 9596).31 Practical reason is the capacity to “discern and weigh
28. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
19–24 (1991) (describing the hierarchical society bottomed on non-egalitarianism that
characterized America just before and after the Revolution).
29. See JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY 43 (2013).
30. Cf. JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND 65, 76, 86 (2012) (arguing that
moral reasoning evolved to seek justification rather than truth, and that moral reasoning
provides only “post hoc rationalizations of gut feelings”).
31. See also JED RUBINFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME 131–44 (2001) (providing an
extended and illuminating discussion of the idea that humans are “beings-over-time”);
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reasons and relate them to one another” (p. 96). And moral
reasoning gives rise to the “momentous capacity of countercausal freedom—an ability to think and act independently of
‘the determining causes of the world of sense[,]’” thereby
“rais[ing] us above our own animality” (p. 100).32 Waldron thinks
all three reasoning capacities are unique to humans, and hence
are predicates for distinctive equality (p. 95). While this is
ultimately an empirical claim, it is not inconsistent with present
scientific understandings.33
Waldron’s third host property is the capacity for personal
autonomy. Relying heavily on Joseph Raz, Waldron identifies
autonomy with the possibility of “authoring or being part-author
of her life” (p. 106). Humans “have the ability more or less
consciously to lead a life for themselves, to see their lives from
the inside out, so to speak, and to make choices in the light of
that seeing” (p. 107). Like the capacity to reason, personal
autonomy seems to be uniquely human.
Waldron does not think that any one of the three properties
is sufficient on its own to ground basic equality.34 There is no
“little nugget of humanity—some unitary soul within . . . that [is]
the host of our dignity and the explanation of our worth” (p.
255). It is the several properties taken together, Waldron thinks,
that account for basic equality.
The three properties unquestionably are important
characteristics of human beings. And, as Waldron thinks, they
may set humans beings apart from all other animals. Even so,
what is the argument that the three properties ground basic
equality’s conclusion that people are “fundamentally one
another’s equals” (p. 10)? It is at this crucial point that the
epistemic modesty of supervenience and “making sense” kick in:

but see Derek Parfit, Personal Identity, 80 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 3, 25 (1971) (arguing for
a discontinuity between one’s selves over time where “there has been any marked change
of character or style of life or any marked loss of memory”).
32. See also p. 101 (whereas the astronomical perspective “‘annihilates, as it were,
my importance as an animal creature,’” a human being’s moral self-awareness “‘infinitely
raises my worth as an intelligence’”).
33. See, e.g., DENNETT, supra note 18, at 98–101, 219–20 (summarizing present
state of knowledge regarding the scope of non-human animal reasoning).
34. A candidate host property Waldron almost summarily rejects is selfconsciousness. I would have liked to learn why. Self-consciousness strikes me as a serious
contender. Indicative of its foundational character, all three host properties can be
readily derived from it.
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basic equality relies on the host properties in the unspecified
respect that supervenience conveys, so as to make basic equality
intelligible, though not a logically compelled conclusion.
Waldron is surely correct when he says his arguments for basic
equality are “very complicated” and “complex” (p. 254-255).
3. The Relational Account
Can more be said to ground basic equality than this?
Perhaps. Waldron summarizes the three properties as “rational
and moral characteristics” (p. 175), but we can go further.
Waldron’s first two host properties, and perhaps his third as
well,35 are relational capacities that account for the uniquely
social beings that humans are.36 The capacities for pain and
affection (particularly love) enable people to transcend instinct
and narrow self-interest (pp. 197-198). Likewise, abstract
reasoning that gives rise to a continuity of self that can be held
accountable in the future for her present acts, together with
practical and moral reasoning (pp. 96, 102), support a person’s
capacities to overcome the urge to act only pursuant to instinct
and present self-interest. These capacities facilitate the most
intimate of enduring relationships, and also massive cooperative
projects with people far removed from us in space and time.37
And as to those massive shared projects, it is the capacity to
reason, which is intertwined with humans’ unique linguistic
capabilities, that permits inter-generational transmissions that
obviate the need for each person and generation to reinvent the
wheel. This inter-generationality permits the refinement of joint

35. Personal autonomy, Waldron’s third property, bears an uncertain relationship
to the relational account. On the one hand, although some choices resulting from the
exercise of personal autonomy might support social relations, other choices might not.
On the other hand, personal autonomy may be unavoidably social-dependent insofar as
our “relation to self is mediated everywhere by our relations to others” and by our
society’s “institutions and practices.” See PINKARD, supra note 23, at 168; see also
JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF,
AUTONOMY, AND LAW (2011).
36. This point is not lost on Waldron, though it does not play a central role in his
account. See p. 87 (speaking of “the interpersonal relations [that the host properties] give
rise to over a whole life”); see also p. 93 (noting that reason is linked to “our highest
relations with one another and with the divine”); p. 198 (the host properties are
“capacities which are relational in character” insofar as they “are not just features of the
individual who has them; they relate him or her to others”).
37. See generally MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, SHARED AGENCY: A PLANNING
THEORY OF ACTING TOGETHER (2014); SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011).
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projects, allowing humans to make profound advances over time
in culture, science, and civilization.
These relational capacities may be what accounts for human
beings’ success from an evolutionary perspective. We humans
are not the largest, strongest, or fastest of creatures. Our
accomplishments as a species are largely owing to the quality
and extent of our social relations, which are made possible by
the very host properties that Waldron identifies.
This relational account of the properties can bolster Step
One’s argument for basic equality.38 These relational properties,
and their social consequences, appear to be unique to humans,
and for that reason advance the case for distinctive equality.
And because the properties beget their awesome relational
consequences only insofar as they are shared by other human
beings, the relational account also reinforces the case for
continuous equality.
4. Equality or Sharedness?
Whether or not one accepts the relational account’s gloss on
Waldron’s argument, the case for basic equality remains
uncertain. Step One identifies a certain commonality, or
sharedness, of human beings, and explains its critical importance
(p. 205). But sharedness is not the same thing as equality. Even if
individuals A and B both share x, there is much aside from x
(say, y and z) that they will not have in common. And equating
sharedness with equality seems particularly questionable in a
circumstance where people have different measures of the
something they do share (for instance, A may have x1 whereas B
has x2), as range properties permit. These two considerations
strongly suggest that sharedness is conceptually different from
equality. Treating sharedness as equality accordingly may be
what philosophers call a category mistake.39
To be sure, Waldron’s formulation that A and B are
“fundamentally equal” (p. 10) tolerates inequalities between A
and B. But the conclusion holds true only if the ways in which A
38. The relational account also bolsters Step Two’s argument, discussed below.
39. See SIMON BLACKBURN, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 58
(1994). The “contorted intellectual gymnastics” needed to make sense of equality may,
instead of constituting necessary “analytic complexity,” be additional evidence of a
category mistake, like heliocentrism and its associated epicycles. See p. 255.
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and B are not the same are not “fundamental.”40 More precisely,
if individual A is characterized by the set (x1, y) and B by (x2, z),
then A is “fundamentally equal” to B if, and only if, the
differences between x1 and x2, and between y and z, are not
“fundamental.” Step Two of Waldron’s argument—the claim
that the host properties are range properties—addresses why x1x2 differentials should not matter for purposes of basic equality.
But as far as I can tell, One Another’s Equals does not put
forward a similar argument as regards y-z differentials.
And doing so would not be easy. It would have to be
established that there are no possible differences across human
beings, apart from the host properties, that are capable of
destroying the fundamental equality between persons A and B.
To put it another way, it would have to be shown that the host
properties are the only relevant criteria for assessing whether A
and B are fundamentally equal. The absence of any such
argument in One Another’s Equals would seem to constitute
additional evidence that the book makes more of a case for
sharedness than equality.
This does not mean equality plays no role in Waldron’s
book. Waldron thinks “the benefit of basic principles of human
worth and human dignity accrues equally to every human
being.” (p. 151). In other words, equality squarely comes into
play in respect of basic equality’s prescriptive implications. If we
pay heed to the distinction between basic equality’s justifications
and its prescriptive contents, we must consider whether the
book’s sharedness argument is adequate to support the
prescriptive work Waldron thinks basic equality performs. Part
III takes up this question.
5. Must Equality Be Renamed?
Imagine it is agreed that One Another’s Equals provides
more of an argument for sharedness than for equality. Does this
clarification have any practical implications?

40. Waldron appears to believe that arguments for basic equality are immune to
Peter Westen’s trenchant critiques of equality (p. 67). See PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF
EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORICAL FORCE OF “EQUALITY” IN MORAL
AND LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990). But the critique above in the text suggests otherwise,
insofar as some notion of fundamental humanity, rather than equality, performs the
analytic work.
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It might be suggested that this is only a pedantic, and
ultimately semantic, point. But I think not. As explained above,
there is a real conceptual difference between sharedness and
equality. Clarifying the nature of Waldron’s argument allows us
to better understand the limits of what that argument
establishes. Moreover, the words we use can have framing
effects that shape our perceptions and normative conclusions.
For example, the terminology of equality might put a thumb on
the scales of Waldron’s normative conclusion that all people
should be treated equally. By contrast, sharedness—the
understanding that people share crucial things by virtue of their
humanity, but also differ from their brethren in crucial ways—
may be a more neutral way of staging the normative question of
what each person is entitled to. And there are other substantive
differences between equality and sharedness. Historian Edmund
Morgan’s cavalier dismissal of the truth of equality41 is consistent
with many uncensored views I have encountered from even leftleaning philosopher friends of mine. I suspect that sharedness
may be a far more defensible position than equality.
On the other hand, I do not mean to suggest that we
necessarily must discard the label “equality.” Equality is an
expression that has a long pedigree in the West generally, and in
the United States in particular. As Waldron rightly observes,
equality bears an “important resonance of indicating the sort of
heritage we are struggling against and the heritage of struggling
against it . . . . Words remind us of movements. And ‘equality’
reminds us of that movement in our civilization” (p. 75, see also
pp. 228-229).
This crucial point can be linked up with the book’s
epistemic modesty in a way that may make the best sense of
Waldron’s project, and that makes clear why that project is so
important. Waldron’s goal of making sense of equality means
that One Another’s Equals is largely directed to an audience for
whom equality already is appealing. That the book provides
more of a justification for sharedness than for equality bolsters
Waldron’s concession that the book’s arguments don’t logically
compel a belief in basic equality. But these concessions in no
way undermine the book’s significance. One Another’s Equals
aims to flesh out one of our political community’s foundational
41.

See MORGAN, supra note 4.
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normative commitments by providing the most holistic,
compelling account of basic equality that it can. That account
can then be used by those of us who have adopted the
commitment to determine if we should continue to do so, and if
so what the commitment’s normative and prescriptive
entailments should be.
There is great value in the human project of examining our
commitments, pace Morgan’s anxiety. And that enterprise is
valuable even as to commitments that make no objective truth
claims, but are “merely” the normative commitments we’ve
undertaken. This is so because commitments play exceedingly
important work for humans.42 Commitments provide coherence
to our lives over time, and are among human beings’ most
important cultural tools for facilitating the interpersonal
cooperation that is necessary for the disparate shared projects
that are pursued among intimates and among strangers. Even if
a cornerstone commitment is not susceptible of logical
demonstration, and in that sense might be said to be a fictive
axiom, it is sensible to submit the commitment to sustained
examination at some point in time.43 Doing so allows those who
have adopted the commitment to have justifiable confidence that
it should be retained.
Of course sustained examination may lead to other
consequences. The commitment may end up being flatly
rejected, or (probably more frequently) reconfigured.
Reconfiguration often is a complex phenomenon. Sometimes
(perhaps typically) reconfiguration is not recognized as such;
people assume the way they have come to understand a
commitment is as it always has been. And reconfiguration
sometimes is so substantial as to amount to a wholesale rewriting
of the original commitment’s substance—what we might call a
rewrite reconfiguration. Consider what occurred with basic
equality’s conceptual cognate of dignity. Dignity originally
served as a concept that differentiated among people and
42. See generally RUBINFELD, supra note 31, at 92–101.
43. The time for this likely is not ripe when the commitment makes its initial
entrance. It typically takes time for a new commitment’s implications to be incrementally
worked out, and for those initial workings-out to be subject to interrogation. The
temporally extended nature of our cultural projects explains the at-first surprising
phenomenon that Waldron aims to provide an account of basic equality so long after that
concept first appeared in western culture. Whereas equality had to be a largely
unexamined axiom in Jefferson’s day, it may be susceptible to deeper justification today.
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generated social hierarchies.44 At some point in time, dignity was
reconfigured so that it referred to what was owed to all human
beings by virtue of their common humanity (p. 3). These two
usages of the term “dignity” share little in common. Indeed, they
are nearly polar opposites.
More generally, reconfiguration seems to be a concomitant
of the human practice of receiving, and transmitting, a
heritage—the intergenerational project of building upon what is
received from our predecessors. This intertemporal human
project may be hindered were each individual contributor to
insist on introducing her own idiosyncratic terminology, even if
that terminology were conceptually clearer. There may be
epistemic benefits to a community-wide discourse with shared
vocabulary.45
So by continuing to use the language of equality, Waldron
makes us participants in an intergenerational project of working
out the implications of a shared, though invariably shifting,
commitment. Reconfigurement, instead of outright replacement,
reflects that our communal identity is linked with those who
earlier introduced and worked with the commitment that we still
today call equality. And reconfigurement may be epistemically
advantageous. Waldron’s continued use of the term equality,
notwithstanding sharedness’ conceptual superiority, may be best
justified in this light.
B. STEP TWO
I believe that Step Two—Waldron’s importation of range
property into equality—is among the book’s most original and
valuable contributions. Waldron gives three powerful reasons
why the host properties are range properties for purposes of
basic equality. He relies most frequently on “our sense of the
specialness that that property, held to whatever degree, confers
upon the individual beings who have it” (p. 139, see also pp. 12544. See MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY 11–12 (2012).
45. Cf. Mark D. Rosen, Religious Institutions, Liberal States, and the Political
Architecture of Overlapping Spheres, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 737, 744 (“[M]embership in the
community of Rawls scholars does not entail treating Rawls’ writings as an
unchallengeable canon of truth. To the contrary, his work serves as the starting point for
critical analysis and, not infrequently, refinement. Rawls thus becomes a focal point
around which a sustained scholarly conversation occurs, which holds out the promise of
generating deeper understandings than if each scholar aimed to develop her own
approach ex nihilo.”).
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126, 199). While persuasive to me, this justification admittedly
has an ipse dixit character to it. The second and third reasons can
be understood as explications of this first one.
Waldron’s second reason is that the host properties “house
the distinctiveness of each person” in the sense that it is each
person’s differential exercise of the properties that accounts for
her uniqueness as an individual (pp. 155-156, see also p. 158).
The very capacities that allow for people’s individuation in terms
of merit and demerit thus account for their sameness as regards
basic equality. This might sound paradoxical at first, but there is
no internal inconsistency. This argument strikes me as very
powerful, though it might be criticized as overly valorizing
autonomy and individuation.
Waldron’s third argument as to why the host properties are
range properties may be the strongest of all. He says that
“[s]ometimes the choice to focus on a certain range property
may be explained in relational terms. Interaction of an important
or valuable kind between beings may require that they both have
properties of a certain sort within a given range” (p. 140). The
relational account developed above bolsters this argument. The
host properties are range properties because their relational
consequences are not dependent on everyone having equal
measures of them. So long as a person’s capacities fall within the
range that permit them to play a role in the massive social
project, they are full members of the human club.46
C. STEP THREE
But what about individuals whose host properties fall
outside the range (pp. 217-225)? The main examples Waldron
discusses are infants and the profoundly disabled (hereinafter,
the PD). To this we might add late stage Alzheimer’s patients
(hereinafter, the LSA).47 Step Three claims that basic equality
fully applies to all such persons. Waldron provides two reasons
why, though he appears to ultimately endorse only one of them
(pp. 248, 254).

46. Not only is scalar equality unnecessary, but interpersonal variations as to
Waldronian host properties probably are evolutionarily beneficial to humans, which is a
crucial consideration to the relational account.
47. Another candidate worth considering is people whose moral reasoning is
profoundly stunted, like Hitler (p. 231).
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Waldron first suggests that the host properties might be
understood not as actual traits, but as potential traits (p. 248).
He then provides a definition of potential48 that would
encompass the PD and LSA.49 Potential thus operates as a
leveler among human beings, such that “the profoundly disabled
person and the person who is not profoundly disabled are on a
par” (p. 247) for purposes of basic equality. More precisely,
understanding the host properties as potentials would mean that
virtually all human beings fall within the range property.
Although a person literally born without a brain may not qualify
under Waldron’s definition,50 virtually every other human being
would. Potential thus expands range property so broadly as to
exclude virtually no one.
Waldron ultimately rejects this option of reconfiguring the
traits as mere potentials (pp. 249-250)—but not for the reasons
we might have expected. We might have expected him to reject
potential on the ground that the concept of range property
presupposes a range—that is to say, a limit that excludes some
candidates, such that the range property cannot be universally
inclusive (pp. 128, 130). And this general analytic point has
substantial force in relation to the specific issue under
consideration. Waldron invoked range property to explain why
people’s scalar differences as to their host properties do not
undermine their basic equality. Range property addressed that
challenge by insisting that some interpersonal differences are
consistent with basic equality—that so long as the people’s
differences fall within some range, the differences don’t matter
for purposes of basic equality (p. 222). The work that range
property performs—eliminating the significance of scalar
differences—thus trades on an implicit concession that the host
properties will not justify basic equality for everybody.51 To take
48. A person has a potential trait if “it is something represented organically (if only
as organic infrastructure) in the life of every human,” it “is to be understood as
something unfolding over time, presenting itself in different ways at different stages of
the human life whose dignity is being considered,” and “it is to be understood as
something fragile, whose unfolding will in every instance be shadowed from beginning to
end by the possibility of organic or genetic failure or damage” (p. 247).
49. Waldron’s explanation as to why basic equality extends to infants is fully
persuasive. See Section IIIC, below.
50. Such a person may not satisfy the first part of Waldron’s definition that the
individual have “something represented organically (if only as organic infrastructure) in
the life of every human” (p. 247).
51. At several points Waldron seems to be explicit about this. See p. 123 (“The
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range property’s argumentative benefit and thereafter
reconfigure the range so it includes everybody asymptotically
approaches a bait-and-switch. To invoke another metaphor,
concluding that everyone falls within the range is just a bridgetoo-far. Finally, if everyone is within range, then something
other than the concept of a range property seems to be doing the
real justificatory work. Call this the set of Potential Objections.
But as indicated above, Waldron does not reject potential
on account of the Potential Objections. He rejects potential
because he fears it is insufficient to make sense of all of basic
equality’s prescriptive implications: “there may seem to be an
insufficient nexus between what we are supposed to be making
sense of (the rights) and what is supposed to make sense of it
(the potential)” (p. 249).52 It “makes little sense,” Waldron says,
to think that mere potential gives rise to rights such as free
speech, personal liberty, and freedom of religion to persons “for
whom the unfolding of that potential is blocked or curtailed” (p.
250). Likewise, Waldron is not confident that potential makes
sense of the respect that is demanded by basic equality, namely
“a form of deference and accommodation” that “include[s]
recognition and acknowledgement of someone as an intellect
with a point of view and opinions of her own.” (p. 250).
Waldron’s approach here is revealing. There was an obvious
alternative to remedy an insufficient nexus between the
justifications for basic equality and its prescriptive implications:
reworking the implications. But Waldron doesn’t even consider
it. This suggests that basic equality’s prescriptive content may be
the dominant driver behind Step Three. More generally, while
the book’s structure suggests that basic equality’s prescriptions
are derivative of the justifications for basic equality, the
derivation may run in just the opposite direction.
Moreover, Waldron’s concern that potential is insufficient
to ground basic equality relies upon a non-axiomatic conception
of its prescriptions—a one-size-fits-all approach that doesn’t
permit basic equality’s concrete demands to vary across people.
For if basic equality’s prescriptions might be tailored across
range-property idea is not supposed to meet th[e] challenge . . . [of] the massive
differences among us that arise in the context of profound disability.”).
52. See also p. 248 (noting his uncertainty in whether “there is a strong enough
connection here between the range property so conceived and the prescriptive force of
basic equality”).
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different people, the insufficient nexus concern could be fully
remedied without jettisoning potential by simply calibrating
potential’s prescriptive implications as necessary.53
In any event, Waldron ultimately concludes that the
properties that are “supposed to underpin basic equality” must
be understood “in terms of the actual presence of capacities like
rationality or moral agency within the human range as ordinarily
defined” (p. 250). But if so, what is to become of the PD and
LSA in particular, and of continuous equality more generally? In
a remarkable act of philosophical alchemy, Waldron propounds
a definition of “actual presence” that encompasses the PD and
LSA. Actual presence for purposes of basic equality includes
three states beyond the case of an ordinarily functioning adult
human being. There is actual presence of a property where the
property is “at the early stages of its unfolding”; for a person
who “may have suffered the misfortune of the unfolding of this
capacity going badly wrong”; and for anyone who “may be at the
end of a life, in which the capacities that underlie human dignity
begin, more or less quickly, to undergo their inevitable
decline . . .” (p. 251). The last two sub-definitions are perfectly
tailored to include the PD and LSA.
This is extraordinary. On Waldron’s approach, there is
actual presence of a host property in someone who cannot
presently exercise it, never will, and even never has. This
“complex” (pp. 250-251) definition of “actual” is not only
peculiar, but substantially drains the term “actual” of its
meaning. After all, under Waldron’s definition, “actual
presence” is at least as capacious a category as “potential
presence.”54 This is not only deeply surprising, but it renders his
definition vulnerable to the above-identified Potential
Objections. To recapitulate: Defining “actual” in a manner that
encompasses everybody is inconsistent with the very concept of
a range property, which presupposes some out-of-range domain;
and concluding that the PD and LSA have in-range host
properties is a switch-and-bait and bridge-too-far. We can now
53. Interestingly, Waldron ultimately adopts a tailored approach to basic equality’s
prescriptions vis-à-vis the PD. See infra Section III.0. This reflects, I believe, an
ambivalence as to whether basic equality is one-size-fits-all or susceptible of tailoring.
Later, I associate Waldron’s attraction to one-size-fits-all with his hope of generating
absolutist prescriptions.
54. While Waldron’s definition of potential may exclude a person born without a
brain, Waldron’s definition of actual would not.
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understand why Waldron didn’t rely on the Potential Objections
when he rejected potential traits: his preferred solution is equally
vulnerable to those objections.
Criticizing Waldron’s arguments for his conclusion is not the
same thing as rejecting the conclusion. I too have sympathy for
the view that basic equality extends to the PD and LSA.
However, the best justification, it seems to me, has nothing to do
with the host properties, but rests on something else entirely.
Basic equality applies to the PD and LSA on account of what
might be called the Groupism Argument: they “belong[] to the
human community” and quite simply are “one of us” (pp. 245246).55 Several powerful considerations that Waldron discusses at
various points in the book support the Groupism Argument.
First, human potentials have a typical trajectory—undeveloped,
developing, developed, and decaying—and “each stage in the
trajectory is shadowed by a variety of ways in which things may
go wrong, ways in which the organism, developed so far, may be
harmed or disabled or fail to develop further” (p. 243).56 “The
possibility of these failures and disabilities is part of the human
condition” (p. 243). As a result, each PD and LSA is “one of us;
like us they had potentials and, just as in our case, those
potentials were fragile and vulnerable” (p. 243).57
Second, the PD and LSA are the brothers and sisters, and
other close relations, of people whose host properties are inrange.58 The PD and LSA are sustained by the “respect, concern,
and love from other humans” (p. 245).59 Every PD “is related to
someone” who has in-range properties, “and in that sense the
profoundly disabled person belongs to the human community”
(p. 246). Third, “[t]here is no other community of carers for the
profoundly disabled person, no other community except the
55. See also p. 251 (noting that there are “stages, vicissitudes, or prospects that are
or have been or will be pertinent to the condition of us all”).
56. Waldron develops these arguments in relation to his defense of distinctive
equality, but I believe they carry over to Step Three’s argument for continuous equality.
57. Echoing the original position’s ethic of reciprocity, Waldron says “the
appropriate reflection on this fragility in the context of any given example of a person
who is profoundly disabled must include the content that could have been me.” (p. 244).
58. Waldron makes similar arguments at various points. E.g., p. 251 (arguing that
we should “recogniz[e] as their brothers and sisters in human dignity those who have
these more complicated features of consummated fragility and human misfortune.”). I
think these arguments deserve promotion from bit player to center stage.
59. This argument may not fully carry over to the LSA, and may be weakened by
the fact that non-human animals can provide vital social roles as well.
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human community to which they belong” (p. 246).
Consequently, “[s]ocially . . . the disabled human is one of us”
(p. 245). The PD and LSA share humanity with the rest of us in
these ways—they are part of our group—and for these reasons
they, too, are beneficiaries of basic equality.
In short, the PD and LSA are included in basic equality, not
on account of the host properties, as Waldron argues, but in
spite of those properties’ absence. Reconfiguring Waldron’s
argument in this manner does not mean that host properties no
longer perform work. For the reasons explained above, the host
properties argument is a powerful justification for the conclusion
that basic equality extends to all persons with in-range
properties. Among its many benefits, Wadron’s argument based
on host properties is strongly universalist. It breaks down
barriers based on nationality, religion, and race, as it reminds us
of the crucial things that (virtually) all of us humans share. But
some special extension argument is necessary for the PD and
LSA,60 because the argument based on in-range host properties
cannot do the job. The Groupism Argument serves as that
extension argument.
I can easily imagine reasons why Waldron might be
reluctant to rely on an independent extension argument. It might
have a different level of robustness than the primary argument.
And a robustness differential might give rise to divergent
prescriptive and normative implications.61 But these
considerations cannot remedy an inadequate primary argument.
Waldron has labored hard to generate a single general argument
for basic equality that can cover everyone, but it is not up to the
task. Perhaps the argument based on range property can be
rejiggered to encompass everybody, although the Potential
Objections suggest this would not work. Or perhaps a wholly
new alternative justification can be developed that does not rely
on the concept of range property, and that encompasses every
human being. As of now, however, I have not yet seen a single

60. Hence I align myself with Rawls rather than Waldron concerning the need for a
special extension argument (p. 134 & n.11). Somewhat mysteriously to me, Waldron
sometimes says he does not rely on range property to ground the basic equality of the PD
(p. 225, and also p. 123). Fairly read, both his potentiality and actual presence arguments
for extending basic equality to the PD rely upon the concept of a range property (pp.
247-248, 250-251).
61. I believe this concern to be a red herring. See infra Section III.B.
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argument for basic equality that adequately justifies continuous
equality.
III. BASIC EQUALITY’S PRESCRIPTIVE WORK
Three facets of Waldron’s argument should be spotlighted if
we are to appreciate the muscular prescriptive work he thinks
basic equality performs. Each facet amounts to an absolutist
claim.
First, as a threshold matter, Waldron thinks that basic
equality extends to absolutely every human being. Basic equality
is non-defeasible as to “terrorists, dictators, mass murderers, and
so on” (p. 151). Second, Waldron thinks basic equality’s “benefit
of basic principles of human worth and dignity accrues equally to
every human being, irrespective of what he or she has done and
what he or she is responsible for” (p. 151). Crudely put, basic
equality’s benefits are absolute in the sense that they “accrue[]
equally” to Mother Theresa and Hitler (p. 151). Third, basic
equality’s normative work is absolute in the sense that it
“trump[s] other moral principles” (p. 186).
Do Waldron’s justifications for the principle of basic
equality satisfactorily justify all this prescriptive work?
A. FIRST ABSOLUTIST CLAIM
As to the First Absolutist Claim, Waldron says “it is a
consequence of basic equality as I understand it that Pol Pot,
Joseph Stalin, and Adolf Hitler are to be regarded as our equals”
(p. 149). Waldron argues that allowing basic equality to be
defeasible in relation to evil persons would be tantamount to
treating Hitler as a “human beast” (p. 153) or as “subhuman”
(pp. 143, 163). This seems right. Though we surely can
distinguish between Hitler and Mother Theresa on many other
important grounds (pp. 150-151)—Mother Theresa lived a more
morally excellent life—evil people are unalterably human, and in
that sense are our equals. But I am less sanguine than Waldron
that his arguments based on in-range host properties are
sufficient to ground this conclusion. I am more inclined to treat
Hitler as a being with out-of-range moral sensibilities. An
independent extension argument is necessary for Hitler, and I
would suggest that the Groupism Argument serves that role.
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B. SECOND ABSOLUTIST CLAIM
The book’s Second Absolutist Claim is that “the benefit of
basic principles of human worth and dignity accrues equally to
every human being, irrespective of what he or she has done and
what he or she is responsible for” (p. 151). Likewise, Waldron
writes “[i]f principles of basic equality, equal worth, and human
dignity do any sort of work at all, they have to generate
normative conclusions about equal concern and respect for
Hitler and [Albert] Schweitzer” (p. 151). And he tells us that
“[t]he work that basic equality does for us and among us
includes the work that it has to do for terrorists, dictators, mass
murderers, and so on” (p. 151).
In truth, there is some ambiguity here as to Waldron’s
position. Even if basic equality’s “normative conclusions about
equal concern and respect” must do work for both Hitler and
Albert Schweitzer, must those conclusions be identical for both
of them? Similarly, though “the benefit of basic principles of
human worth and dignity accrues equally to every human
being,” does this mean that those principles’ concrete demands62
are identical across every person, regardless of (for instance)
“what he or she has done and what he or she is responsible for”?
And while basic equality must “do work” for both us and
dictators, are the final products of that work identical? Only
affirmative answers to each of these three questions would
qualify Waldron’s position as an absolutist claim.
As written, I think these passages from One Another’s
Equals are most naturally read as embracing the Second
Absolutist Claim. Bolstering an absolutist interpretation,
negative answers to the last paragraph’s three questions would
leave basic equality’s prescriptive implications more open-ended
than Waldron aspires to provide. And too, the proposition that
basic equality’s prescriptive demands might vary across people
sits uneasily with the book’s tendency to equate the principle of
basic equality with its prescriptions. Also supporting an
absolutist reading is Waldron’s explicit defense of moral
absolutes in other writings, and his reliance on that absolutist
view when concluding that torturing terrorists to discover a

62. Cf. Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86
GEO. L.J. 569, 586–88 (1998) (arguing that meaning may remain constant while its
concrete applications can vary over time).
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ticking bomb is always wrong.63 And recall that Waldron’s
rejection of potentiality to ground the PD’s inclusion in basic
equality presupposed that basic equality’s normative
implications were one-size-fits-all, which is another way of
putting the Second Absolutist Claim.
But perhaps Waldron does not really embrace the Second
Absolutist Claim after all. After concluding that basic equality
extends to the PD, Waldron tells us that its normative work can
be expected to vary in relation to them. Though “we recognize
the profoundly disabled person as one of us,” Waldron tells us
there can be “nuanced application of [basic equality’s] normative
implications,” and that “there will be normative implications
that cannot apply” (p. 252). For example, “there will be less
concern about independence,” and “[t]here will be choices that
are normally privileged by rights that become problematic in the
case of the profoundly disabled” (pp. 252-253).64
So which is it: Are basic equality’s prescriptive and
normative implications absolute, or does basic equality permit
“nuanced application”? Absolutism no doubt has an allure: it
promises clear answers to questions that might be epistemically
difficult, and constrains future decisionmakers whom we might
not completely trust. As to the hermeneutic task of identifying
the best interpretation of One Another’s Equals, I think the
book is best read as propounding the Second Absolutist Claim,
subject to only a narrow exception for “nuanced applications”
on behalf of the PD on account of the “complicated” actualrange rationale (analyzed above) that extends basic equality to
the PD (pp. 250-252). Insofar as generating determinate
prescriptions is one of Waldron’s driving motivations, an
interpretation that generally licensed nuanced applications of
the highly abstract principle of equality must be disfavored, for it
would sharply undercut that goal.
But absolutism’s benefits come with costs, as Waldron’s
discussion of the PD illuminates. Invariable treatment of the PD
would not be normatively sensible for the very reasons Waldron
63. See Jeremy Waldron, What Are Moral Absolutes Like?, 18 HARV. REV. PHIL.
4, 26 (2012) (acknowledging that he has not yet developed a definitive “answer to the
question [of] how the absolutist deals with the burden of the humanitarian considerations
that seem to motivate the infringement of his absolute principle.”).
64. For example, the PD “may not have or be able to conceive a view or a
preference to express as a vote in an election” (p. 253).
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observes. While Waldron provides an argument as to why
nuanced applications are appropriate for the PD (pp. 250-252),
he provides no reason to think that the PD are the only
subpopulation for whom nuanced applications might be
appropriate. The point can be put more abstractly: even if scalar
differences as to in-range host properties do not undermine
people’s fundamental equality, it does not ineluctably follow that
those differences should be irrelevant to determining basic
equality’s concrete prescriptions. The recognition that Waldron’s
arguments support sharedness more than equality further
supports the proposition that differential treatment may be
normatively appropriate on account of what people do not share.
While allowing nuanced applications would deflate the
prescriptive and normative payoff Waldron seems to hope for, it
would not render his book valueless. It is true that Waldron’s
readers wouldn’t emerge with a ready list of basic equality’s
invariable entailments. But defending and clarifying the
principle that human beings are fundamentally one another’s
equals on account of crucial properties that we humans share—
what I take to be the book’s core contribution—is a critical step
to securing the principle’s intelligent application and further
development.
More generally, the Second Absolutist Claim would deny
tomorrow’s decisionmakers agency in determining basic
equality’s appropriate normative implications.65 Absolutism
reflects an implicit promise that all the difficult normative work
can be completed at one point in time, such that later
decisionmakers can rely on those conclusions and simply apply
them to whatever may arise in the future. Absolutism thus rests
on a belief in normativity’s equivalent of an end-of-history, as
well as the confidence that we’ve finally reached that end-ofhistory. For those doubtful of either or both of these premises, it

65. On the one hand, this agency-ceding is in tension with Waldron’s repeated
recognition of the non-algorithmic, non-mechanistic nature of moral reasoning. See, e.g.,
p. 160 (noting that “one of the remarkable things about moral agency” is “it won’t work
as a machine or algorithm. The capability we have is much more subtle than that,
nuanced and geared for novelty and capable of coming to terms with what is unusual in
human affairs”); p. 200 (praising “Kant’s moral philosophy and the Christian
understanding of morality [that] emphasize[s] agency, not just the passive status of being
a child of God.”). On the other hand, such absolutism is consistent with Waldron’s past
championing of absolute moral values.
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seems preferable that people recognize their agency, and their
responsibility for exercising it.
C. THIRD ABSOLUTIST CLAIM
Although there may be some uncertainty as to whether
Waldron endorses the Second Absolutist Claim, he seems to
firmly embrace the Third Absolutist Claim that basic equality
appropriately trumps all competing moral values. The principle
of basic equality, Waldron tells us, “has to have the power to
override positions whose moral importance is undeniable” (p.
149).66 For example, Waldron thinks basic equality must be able
to “stop” arguments that would justify “torturing or
assassinating a murderous terrorist . . . in its tracks” (pp. 186187). Without any qualifications or further justifications,
Waldron concludes that basic equality trumps any and all
competing values, such as saving innocents’ lives or securing
political stability.
In what follows, I will suggest that Waldron’s Third
Absolutist Claim suffers three defects: it is substantially
unargued, unduly agency-denying, and normatively suspect.
1. Substantially Unargued
Waldron tells us that “[s]ome of our deepest principles
present themselves to us in an uncompromising and
nonnegotiable way. They are not supposed to be norms that we
have control over; they are not for us to tamper with” (pp. 187188).67 Waldron may be correct as a phenomenological matter
that people naturally conceptualize their principles in absolutist
terms, but Hume’s Law—which teaches that an “ought” cannot
be derived from an “is”68—counsels that this fact cannot on its
own serve as a normative argument for absolutism. After all,
people might be mistaken in this regard.
Moreover, Waldron’s phenomenological claim may not be
descriptively correct. Perhaps absolutist sensibilities pertain only

66. Although Waldron does not explicitly say that basic equality trumps all
contending values, his analysis seems to presuppose this.
67. Although “[n]ot all of our morality can be like this,” Waldron proposes that
“perhaps some of the foundations have this nonnegotiable character” (p. 188).
68. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469 (L.A. Selby-Bigge
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1739); SCANLON, supra note 18, at 33.
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for so long as people focus on only one principle. Perhaps people
ultimately realize that they hold more than one principle, that
those principles sometimes can come into conflict with one
another, and that in such circumstance one or both must give
way to some degree. Indeed, I suspect that this more accurately
describes what happens to principles over time. But my
descriptive account also is subject to Hume’s Law, and
accordingly cannot on its own qualify as a normative argument.
After all, people might be wrong in abandoning their initial
absolutist sensibility.
So we are unavoidably in need of normative arguments in
relation to absolutism. I can imagine only three possible
arguments that can support the Third Absolutist Claim. The
first, which might be called monism, is that there exists only a
single, internally consistent principle.69 On this view, what
appears to us as multiple normative principles is simply a
mistake; properly conceived, all apparently distinct principles
are part of a single, internally consistent grand principle. The
second possible argument, which we might call soft pluralism, is
that although there are multiple normative principles, all of them
peacefully coexist; properly understood, no conflict among them
is possible. The third, which might be called strict ordinality,
acknowledges that there are multiple principles that potentially
conflict, but insists that one principle always trumps all others.
One Another’s Equals does not advance a monist claim.70 At
one point in the book Waldron appears to endorse soft pluralism
when he offhandedly observes that that “[i]f our morality is wellorganized, the relevant principles do not contradict one another”
(p. 162). More consistently, however, the book endorses strict
ordinality. It repeatedly tells us that basic equality has to
perform “heavy lifting” (p. 145) (emphasis omitted) insofar as it
“has to have the power to override positions whose moral
importance is undeniable” (p. 149).71

69. Elsewhere I have explored in detail all three possibilities. See Mark D. Rosen,
Two Ways of Conceptualizing the Relationship Between Equality and Religious Freedom,
4 J. L. RELIGION & ST. 117, 122–35 (2016) [hereinafter Rosen, Two Ways].
70. For an explanation of what a monist claim must consist of, see id. at 123–26.
71. See also p. 148 (noting that basic equality must be “able to stand up to and if
necessary to trump the work of certain other bona fide moral principles”); p. 186 (stating
equality “needs . . . to be morally robust enough to trump other moral principles that
appear to have bona fides of their own”).

9 - ROSEN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

10/6/18 10:58 AM

BOOK REVIEWS

523

Waldron recognizes that “this trumping power cannot be
assumed: it has to be explained” (p. 149). But I can find very
little explanation for this crucial point in the book. Certainly
there are no sustained arguments on behalf of strict ordinality
(or, as indicated above, for monism or soft pluralism).72 The
most detailed justification for the Third Absolutist Claim
appears in the chapter entitled A Religious Basis of Equality?
Here it is:
[S]ome of our deepest principles present themselves to us in
an uncompromising and nonnegotiable way. They are not
supposed to be norms that we have control over; they are not
for us to tamper with. Not all of our morality can be like
this . . . . But perhaps some of the foundations have this
nonnegotiable character (pp. 187-188).

And why should this be so? All Waldron tells us is that a
religious justification for basic equality may be “necessary” to
ground its “nonnegotiability” (p. 188). “Perhaps if we think of a
position as commanded by God, we understand ourselves as
more passive in the face of the principles put forward for our
consideration than moral philosophers generally take themselves
to be” (p. 188) (emphasis added).
It is striking that so critical a part of Waldron’s argument
depends upon a religious claim that cannot be expected to be
resonant with, let alone persuasive to, a sizable swath of
Waldron’s readers, on account of the fact that it is religiously
bottomed.73 Moreover, it is a largely unargued religious claim
insofar as it asserts that—but does not explain why—God would
want this particular principle to be absolute, and for humans to
substantially cede their agency in determining what the principle
concretely entails in this world.74 After all, many religious
traditions posit that humanity has important work to perform in
72. For a detailed consideration of what justifications for each of these would look
like, see Rosen, Two Ways, supra note 69, at 123–30.
73. I am not suggesting that religious argumentation is inappropriate, for I am
largely sympathetic with Waldron’s critique of public reason (pp. 210-213). While I agree
that religious people should be able to give “the fullest and most honest account they
can” (p. 213), it is troubling that a religious argument is the only support Waldron can
muster for so central a plank of his thesis. This may not be troubling to Waldron. See p.
179 (noting that “we have to ask how much of our account of human dignity, human
worth, and basic human equality is bound up with religious ideas, and how much of it
would have to be purged” without religious ideas).
74. Waldron rightly observes that “the principle of basic equality has mainly
secular work to do. It does its work in the world, here on earth among us” (p. 182).
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working out the requirements of such weighty matters as what
morality and natural law require.75
2. Unduly Agency-Denying
The ceding of agency that Waldron here embraces—the
greater “passiv[ity]” (p. 188) as regards basic equality’s
normative work—sits uneasily with his argumentative
methodology for justifying basic equality, which aims to “make
sense” of it by relying heavily on the reader’s intuitions and
sensibilities. If intuitions were valid as regards basic equality’s
justifications, why not its normative work as well? Waldron’s call
for greater passivity in determining basic equality’s normative
entailments thus seems to be in deep tension with the bulk of
One Another’s Equals’ methodology.
Finally, as was true of his Second Absolutist Claim,
Waldron does not consistently stick to the Third Absolutist
Claim either. In defending the position that basic equality fully
applies to babies, Waldron advances what he calls a “trajectory
view of a human life,” which makes basic equality fully
applicable to all stages of a person’s life (pp. 234-235). Waldron
recognizes that this has implications for abortion. Yet although
he takes the position that the fetal stage is part of this full
trajectory, Waldron concludes “[i]t does not follow that there
should be laws prohibiting abortion” because “abortion policy is
about what the law should or should not do so far as interfering
with the reproductive lives of women is concerned” (p. 235).
Waldron thus concedes that a fetus is entitled to basic
equality, but thinks the law can allow its “early stage of a human
life” to be ended at the largely unchecked insistence of another
person. If so, basic equality’s normative work does not seem to
amount to that much. And why, according to Waldron, can a
fetus’ early stage life be ended? On account of the “reproductive
lives of women” (p. 235). Far from treating the normative
entailments of the fetus’ basic equality as a nonnegotiable
absolute, Waldron allows it to be overridden.76 Once again,

75. And Waldron recognizes this many times in the book (pp. 190–91, 193, 197).
76. That competing principle concerning women’s reproductive lives might be
conceptualized as an autonomy principle, or possibly as an aspect of basic equality.
Either way, Waldron’s allowance for abortion would appear to permit compromise of the
normative entailments of the fetus’ basic equality.
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Waldron blinks when staring down absolutism’s concrete
implications.77 He exercises active agency when setting out basic
equality’s concrete policy implications for abortion.
The Third Absolutist Claim has critical implications for
constitutional doctrine. An unwavering insistence on the Third
Absolutist Claim would radically destabilize abortion
jurisprudence, as it would seem to call for a widespread if not
universal prohibition of abortion to protect the fetus’ basic
equality. More generally, insofar as constitutional doctrine
almost always permits constitutional rights to be infringed to
achieve sufficiently important countervailing interests in
sufficiently narrow ways,78 the Third Absolutist Claim is in
severe tension with large swaths of constitutional jurisprudence.
More precisely, the Third Absolutist Claim would appear to
destabilize the jurisprudence of any and all constitutional rights
that are grounded in basic equality—which, according to
Waldron, includes free speech, personal liberty, and freedom of
religion (p. 249).
3. Normatively Suspect
Though Waldron blinks when considering the Third
Absolutist Claim’s implications for abortion, he does not always
blink. For example, he is steadfastly absolute as regards a
captured terrorist who has information that might save the lives
of innocents. Waldron insists the terrorist cannot be tortured to
extract that information, even if torture is the only method of
procuring information that would save innocent peoples’ lives
(pp. 186-187).
But why can the normative entailments of the fetus’ basic
equality be traded off to achieve a countervailing interest while
the terrorist’s basic equality cannot? Waldron does not tell us, so
we are left to our own speculations. I can think of only two. First,
perhaps the fetus’s normative entailments are subject to some
sliding scale on account of its early stage in life or its being
physically located within its mother. If so, Waldron has deviated

77.
III.

Basic equality’s entailments vis-à-vis the PD was the other. See supra Section

78. See generally Mark D. Rosen, When Are Constitutional Rights Non-Absolute?
McCutcheon, Conflicts, and the Sufficiency Question, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1535,
1537–40 (2015) [hererinafter Rosen, Non-Absolute].
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once again from the Second Absolutist Claim, insofar as he does
not treat basic equality’s entailments as one-size-fits-all, but
instead tailors them across subpopulations on the basis of their
special properties. But if tailoring is appropriate on account of
location on life’s temporal trajectory, why not also for a terrorist
whose moral reasoning is out-of-range?
Second, perhaps the normative entailments of the fetus’
basic equality can be compromised because nonnegotiability
would impinge on a countervailing principle—women’s
autonomy, or perhaps their basic equality insofar as they could
not control their reproductive lives. But couldn’t it similarly be
said that nonnegotiability of the normative entailments of the
terrorist’s basic equality may impinge on the autonomy interests
or basic equality of the innocents who will be killed if the attack
is not averted?79
Because Waldron blinks as regards abortion, we are entitled
to ask why he does not blink when he considers the terrorist. His
treatment of abortion means he is not entitled to answer by
simply stating that basic equality’s prescriptive and normative
entailments are absolute and nonnegotiable. But even if
Waldron did not blink in relation to abortion—if he changed his
position so that he could say “I treat basic equality’s entailments
as nonnegotiable absolutes in all circumstances”—we should ask
whether this is normatively appropriate.
As to that, two things should be said. First, as explained
above, One Another’s Equals does not provide much of an
affirmative argument on behalf of the Third Absolutist Claim; all
we get is a questionable phenomenological assertion joined with
a largely unargued religious claim. Second, there seems to be
strong reasons to doubt that the Third Absolutist Claim is
normatively justifiable. While fully defending this position is a
task beyond this Review’s scope, Waldron’s blinks provide
insights into why absolutism is problematic. As suggested by his
discussion of abortion, the normative universe we humans
inhabit seems to be composed of multiple commitments that
sometimes can conflict; conflict is possible because the
multiplicity cannot be reduced to one, and because the
79. More precisely, the permissibility of torture would be dependent on the
empirical question of torture’s relative efficacy vis-à-vis other methods of obtaining the
life-saving information. I do not claim to know the answer to that question.
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multiplicity does not always peacefully coexist.80 And these
multiple commitments cannot be neatly parceled into a
predetermined hierarchy that satisfactorily decides which
principle should trump in the event of conflict, on account of the
fact-sensitivity of each commitment’s normative force and the
limits of human foresight.81 Sorting out what is to be done with
our multiple, potentially conflicting commitments is inescapably
context-sensitive, and requires judgment. Recognizing that
agency would seem to be a prerequisite to exercising our
judgment as well as we humanly can. These reasons together
explain why ceding our agency by latching onto an absolute
prescription should be highly suspect.
To put it bluntly, Waldron’s blinks suggest an unwillingness
on his part to relinquish agency. Why should his readers do
otherwise?
IV. CLOSING—THOUGH NOT CONCLUDING—
THOUGHTS
To help get a handle on this abstract talk about
commitments’ fact-sensitivity, multiplicity, and amenability to
conflict, consider basic equality’s implications for some difficult
life-ending issues. Does basic equality dictate a single normative
position toward the Jainist practice of Sallekhana, in which very
old or very ill people stop eating, so as to die?82 As to whether
the terminally ill or very old have a right-to-die? Does accepting
basic equality determine the medical resources that should be
devoted to the aged or to the terminally ill? Or what resources
should be directed to babies who enter the world profoundly
disabled?
Now consider some more general methodological questions:
Are basic equality’s concrete demands absolutely invariable
across all the subpopulations identified above? Does basic
equality trump all possible competing commitments? Are these
80. See Rosen, Non-Absolute, supra note 78, at 1543–60.
81. Waldron’s blink as regards the normative implications regarding the PD
illustrates the context-sensitivity of normative commitments. See Rosen, Non-Absolute,
supra note 78, at 1582–83 (2015) (discussing the context-sensitivity of normative
commitments); John McDowell, Virtue and Reason, 62 MONIST 331 (1979) (defending the
view that morally correct outcomes are fact-sensitive).
82. See Justic T.K. Tukol, Sallekhana, https://www.jainworld.com/education/
seniors/senles15.htm (last visited July 7, 2018).
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questions best answered by adopting a “passive” approach?
What would that even mean?
I am not certain how any of the first set of life-ending
questions should be answered. But as regards the
methodological questions, I have considerably more confidence.
It seems hard to believe that basic equality’s concrete
implications should be invariable across all those scenarios, or
that basic equality trumps all conceivable competing interests.
For these reasons, actively acknowledging our necessary agency
in answering these questions seems to be a superior mindset than
passivity.
As regards the exercise of our agency in addressing these
types of difficult questions, Waldron’s book is invaluable. Its
deep and careful prodding of basic equality’s justificatory
grounds better enables us to work out basic equality’s proper
normative entailments. For example, Waldron’s argument that
basic equality’s dignitary entailments are partly owing to the
human capacities for moral reasoning and counter-causal
freedom seems highly germane to the question of whether
people on the threshold of Alzheimer’s Disease should have a
right to assisted suicide, which in turn may implicate
constitutional autonomy issues.83 In short, the Review’s
arguments against Waldron’s absolutist claims, and the Review’s
insistence that One Another’s Equals not be understood as
providing definitive prescriptive and normative answers, is not
tantamount to saying that the book leaves us where we were
before. Clarifying the principles that undergird basic equality is
necessary to allow for equality’s intelligent application and
further development.84

83. The Supreme Court confronted the question of whether there is a
constitutionally protected right-to-die, but declined to provide a general answer to it, in
Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990).
84. It is to be hoped that acknowledging the need for our ongoing agency does not
invite the sort of purely self-regarding behaviors that are characteristic of ordinary
politics. Decisions concerning our foundational societal commitments, like equality,
appropriately make different demands than do the decisions that belong to the domain of
ordinary politics. See generally Mark D. Rosen, The Special Norms Thesis, 40 CARDOZO
L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). And as regards the heightened demands that ought to apply
to decisionmaking concerning a society’s foundational commitments, the many insights
afforded by One Another’s Equals’ careful and thoughtful analysis are both appropriate
and necessary.
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To be sure, even the responsible exercise of our agency may
not yield objectively verifiable results, on account of the nature
of the domain of knowledge to which these normative questions
belong.85 If so, an informed societal consensus that arises after
active consideration may be the only, and best, outcome for
which we can hope.86 Although I concededly have not provided
comprehensive arguments for this proposition, or for the last
paragraph’s affirmative claims, I hope that this Review has
shown that One Another’s Equals has not provided sufficient
arguments to establish its alternative absolutist theses.
To conclude, Waldron’s illuminating investigation of basic
equality immeasurably advances our preparedness for
continuing the agency-demanding task of working out the
entailments of our communal commitment to basic equality.
Basic equality may not be a Jeffersonian axiomatic truth, though
perhaps it had to be treated as such when our political culture
first embraced it. But thanks to Waldron, basic equality is no
longer a Morganian unexamined fiction. Waldron’s careful
analysis should not trigger Morganian anxiety—to the contrary, I
am confident our political culture can be the better for it. But
the book’s benefits are best realized if we recognize that working
out the entailments of our collective commitment to equality
requires self-conscious agency, not absolutism-induced passivity.

85. For an illuminating discussion of the different domains of knowledge, and the
claim that each has distinctive methods and criteria for establishing truth claims, see
SCANLON, supra note 18, at 19–20.
86. This may be particularly true in relation to challenges that all of us are equally
(more or less) likely to face at some point in our lives.

